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In a well-functioning digital economy, consumers
should be able to make autonomous and informed
choices, and companies compete fairly. One of
the barriers preventing such well-functioning is dark
patterns—designs that mislead users into making specific
purchase-related choices. In this research, through a
qualitative inquiry (expert interviews), we classify dark
patterns based on the harmful ways such designs affect
the digital market. Moreover, we analyze data using
the behavior change framework and illustrate ways
to prevent dark patterns and grant consumers greater
protection and autonomy. Our exploratory results outline
potential solutions policymakers might apply to improve
digital market well-functioning.
1. Introduction
A well-functioning digital market and consumer
well-being are factors relevant to a sustainable economy,
considering sustainability defined as the improvement of
human well-being over time, especially in the economic,
social, and environmental sense [1].
In the digital market, the end-user (consumer)
empowerment could be one way towards “digital
suistainability” [2]. The empowered consumers may
drive innovation, productivity, and market competition [3,
4]. They strive to reduce uncertenity [3] and to
make optimal decisions, understanding their “own
preferences and choices available to them” [4].
Consumer empowerment relies partially on consumers
themselves (e.g., skills, knowledge) and partially on
the protection, regulation, and institutions developed to
help consumers. Therefore, consumers must possess
sufficient information, opportunities, and autonomy over
their decisions while being granted adequate protection
and understand how to utilize it. Nevertheless, today’s
digital companies frequently set barriers preventing
consumer empowerment and, consequently, the market
well-functioning.
We study some of such barriers affecting consumer
empowerment through detriment. We refer mainly to
the personal detriment—“the difference between the
value that consumers reasonably expected to get from
a good or service and the value that they actually get
from it, relating to problems experienced by consumers
post-purchase” [5]. To some extent, we also consider
issues related to structural detriment, of which one
characteristic is a regulatory failure.
We focus on one type of barrier —dark patterns—user
interfaces (UIs) purposefully designed to mislead users.
As a result, users cannot follow their preferences and
desires and may become subject to manipulations [6].
Over the last decade, dark patterns received much
attention in multidisciplinary research, identifying many
categories of dark patterns (e.g., [7, 8, 9, 10]). Two
objectives of this study extend the knowledge of the
phenomena and add to the existing categorization. First,
we attempt to investigate the harmfulness of dark patterns.
Second, we aim to provide policymakers insights about
changes needed to eliminate detrimental effects that they
might have on consumers.
Our results imply the need for new categorization of
dark patterns, according to how harmful the techniques
that different dark patterns rely on are—what we label
as first-generation and second-generation dark patterns.
Further, our findings determine what policymakers could
do, mainly to provide consumers with autonomous and
informed decisions and ensure fair market competition.
We systematize the results according to a well-established
behavioral change framework, making our findings
easier to apply. Additionally, our results highlight the
issues related to consumer vulnerability, notably how the
meaning of vulnerability in the digital market diverges
from the traditional perception of this construct.
2. Background
In the traditional economic sense, the empowered
consumer must possess sufficient information enabling
optimal choice—as the ultimate goal is to maximize





Figure 1. Sneak into basket dark pattern exploiting
status quo effect—consumer will unlikely make any
changes to the predefined selection.
benefit [11]. Consequently, sometimes companies are
required by law to disclose specific information, e.g.,
attributes recommended by the OECD, such as the price
for the product/service, Terms & Conditions (T&Cs),
payment and delivery, and information about consumer
rights after purchase [12]. These information disclosures
are usually conveyed to the consumer through UI design.
2.1. Information and UI design
Some suggest that there are two ways through which
people’s decisions might be influenced [13]. One way
is to change the available options presented to the
decision-maker in the decision space. Another way is to
change how people understand their options by altering
their decision-making processes. The two strategies are
common in UI designs, not always to manipulate but
also to persuade the user (via rational persuasion, the
designer aims to change the user’s mind by presenting
the arguments for further reflection and evaluation of
a decision). However, some designs manipulate the
decision process; they usually target users’ psychological
vulnerabilities, preying on cognitive shortcomings.
One of such manipulative UI designs is dark
patterns—“tricks used in websites and apps that make
you do things that you didn’t mean to, like buying or
signing up for something” [14]. Here, consumers cannot
follow their preferences and desires and become subject
to exploitation [6]. Dark patterns are heavily rooted in
psychology and behavioral sciences findings, applying
knowledge about humans’ reliance on heuristics and
biases into the digital space.
2.1.1. Decision-making. Commencing the online
purchasing process, consumers usually have preferences
about the goods or services that best suit their current
needs. Yet, at times, consumers do not align their
choices with their initial preferences. Such a gap
between attitudes and behaviors is not unique to digital
environments. In psychology and behavioral sciences,
such phenomena have been recognized as typical of
human behavior. One way to explain it is through
the dual-process theories, implying that people make
decisions using the two different information processing
modes working in parallel. The first mode is Type 1,
based on automatic, fast, and uncomplicated information
processing. It is responsible for decisions that do
not require working memory [16, 17]. The second
mode—Type 2—involves complex, slower information
processing, access to working memory, and is often
considered more rational [16]. Despite the potential
benefits of Type 2 processing, people’s daily decisions
mostly rely on Type 1 because it requires less cognitive
effort. It utilizes mental shortcuts–—heuristics enabling
quick and efficient problem solving and decisions. One
downside of heuristics is that they may result in cognitive
biases (i.e., subjective patterns and inclinations towards
choices not always the most optimal). In effect, the
decisional outcomes might be less beneficial.
Thaler & Sunstein described how such cognitive
shortcomings could be applied in choice architecture
to improve human well-being, introducing the concept
of nudging [18]. A nudge is “any aspect of the
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in
a predictable way without forbidding any options or
significantly changing their economic incentives” [18].
Some governments successfully applied nudges to affect
decision-makers in the physical space; e.g., default
heuristic increased organ donations, decreased waiting
times, and lowered the number of deaths [19].
2.1.2. Digital design and dark patterns. The
concept of nudging is not a stranger to the online
environment, and small changes in the UI design may
impact consumer preferences and decisions [20, 21].
Moreover, design influence might be more effective if UIs
exploit consumers’ psychological vulnerabilities [18].
For example, when UI contains pre-selected boxes
triggering the status quo bias (Figure 1) or when the
choice presentation triggers primacy or recency effects.
Online companies might abuse nudging [22] to
maximize profits while having adverse effects on
users (e.g., economic loss, intrusiveness, reduction
of autonomy). One example of such abuse is dark
patterns. To tackle the dark patterns and clarify their
effects, researchers attempted to categorize them [7,
9, 10, 6]. For instance, [6] summarized the existing
categorizations as the main eight categories: nagging,
social proof, obstruction, sneaking, interface interference,
forced action, scarcity, and urgency. In the context
of online shopping, based on a data set from about
11K websites and 53K products, [10] established a
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Interventions Policy categories
Education Increasing knowledge and comprehension Communication Using print, electronic, telephonic, or
broadcast media
Persuasion Communication inducing positive or negative
feeling s to stimulate action
Guidelines Creating document that recommend or mandate
practice (including changes in the service provision)
Incentivisation Creating an expectation of reward Fiscal Using the tax system to reduce or increase the
financial cost
Coercion Creating an expectation of punishment or cost Regulation Establishing rules or principles of behavior or
practice
Training Imparting skills Legislation Making or changing laws
Restriction Applying rules that reduce the opportunity to
engage in the target behavior
Environmental/Social planning Designing and/or controlling
the physical or social environment
Environmental restructuring Changing the physical or social
context
Service provision Delivering a service
Modeling Providing example to aspire to or imitate
Enablement Increasing means/reducing barriers to increase
capability or opportunity
Table 1. Definitions of intervention functions and policy categories (as presented in Michie et al. [15]).
five-dimensional taxonomy of dark patterns: asymmetric,
covert, deceptive, hides information, restrictive.
Despite the extensive literature on dark patterns,
it remains challenging to distinguish dark patterns
from useful designs. Such distinction is essential
because some designs genuinely aim to help users,
presenting helpful information or supporting informed
choices. In an attempt to tackle this issue, building
on previous research, [23] proposed to classify dark
patterns according to their effects on user’s choice:
modifying the decision space (asymmetric, restrictive,
disparate treatment, and covert dark patterns) and
manipulating the information flow (deceptive, and
information hiding dark patterns). Further, they proposed
that the normative perspective should be considered
when assessing the “darkness” of patterns, considering
individual and collective welfare, regulatory objective
(instrumental perspective), and an individual’s autonomy.
2.2. Behavior change
Taking into account online companies and their
influence on consumer behavior, in this research,
we applied the COM-B (Capability, Opportunity,
Motivation-Behavior) framework [15]. This framework
has been developed to help in identifying intervention
functions and policy categories that might prevent
policymakers from disregarding aspects essential to
well-designed policies [15]. Although this framework
was initially designed and used in the health context [15],
it can be applied in other areas [24], e.g., sustainable
circular economy [25].
The COM-B model assumes three components that
interact and generate behavior: capability, opportunity,
and motivation [15]. Capability refers to an individual’s
psychological and physical capacity to engage in the
given activity. Motivation refers to all the brain processes
that stimulate and direct behavior. The opportunity
contains all the factors that lie outside of the individual
that make the behavior possible. The COM-B recognizes
that different intervention types may change one or more
of these three components and consequentially influence
behavior. The framework’s authors further proposed
the behavior change wheel (BCW), offering possible
interventions that might steer changes [15]. The BCW
includes nine intervention functions and seven policy
categories, presented in Table 1.
This work aims to understand the harmfulness of dark
patterns better. The other goal is to inform policymakers
about the potential solutions that could help ensure
a well-functioning digital market, reducing consumer
detriment. Hence, we raise two research questions:
RQ1: How can we classify the harmfulness of dark
patterns?
RQ2: How can we reduce the detrimental effects that
dark patterns have on the consumer?
3. Method
Due to the exploratory nature of our research
questions and because we aimed to identify ways to
overcome the effects of dark patterns, we used expert
interviews1. The expert interview is a qualitative method,
based on a topical guide, focusing on the knowledge of
the expert from a certain field [27]. In our work, expert
interviews enabled obtaining in-depth knowledge from
people familiar with the concept of dark patterns, who
have a good understanding of the digital market. We
gathered different types of knowledge (technical, process,
1The study was a part of a larger project; here, we report only on
the parts of the project related to dark patterns. The interested reader
can access our published report describing methodology and findings
in [26].
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and interpretive), which could be used to explore and
ground theoretical concepts [28].
Before the exploratory interviews, we conducted a
literature review [26], identifying previous reviews of
research on dark patterns (19 articles). Next, we extracted
27 dark patterns that might affect consumers during
online purchasing and gathered information related to
T&Cs. Based on our literature review, we composed a
semi-structured interview study with four open-ended
questions. In this paper, we only report answers to three
of these questions2. First, we asked which dark patterns
might be most harmful to the consumer (a) and what
measures should be applied to overcome the obstacles
caused by dark patterns and disclosures in T&Cs (b).
Next, we asked whether specific user groups might
be affected more by dark patterns and contemporary
presentations of T&Cs (c).
We interviewed eight experts from law, economy,
philosophy, and behavioral and cognitive sciences. The
interviews were conducted in English (four participants
were native speakers, and the rest were fluent in English).
Five experts were selected among the participants of
a dark patterns webinar. They either participated in
the event actively as presenters or passively as the
audience (here, we included some pioneers of the dark
patterns and dark patterns’ researchers). The rest of our
experts were employees from the Swedish Consumer
Agency—involved in organizing the webinar, having
the expertise related to digital markets and consumer
rights, and being familiar with the concept of dark
patterns. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all interviews
were conducted online through a video conferencing
platform in November 2020. Before the interviews,
each participant received informed consent to sign and
return to the researcher in charge, agreeing to record the
interviews.
During the interview, participants were informed how
the interview would look and explained the topic of
interest, including the definition of dark patterns. The
interviews’ duration ranged from 30 minutes to one
hour. The interviews were audio-recorded and manually
transcribed. We analyzed transcripts through thematic
analysis (RQ1) and deductive analysis based on the
COM-B framework—Table 1 (RQ2).
4. Results
We first present findings related to the harmfulness
of dark patterns, followed by possible ways to overcome
2We do not report answers to question: T&Cs are often means used
to provide consumers with [informed choice enabling] information.
What do you think are the main barriers that consumers encounter
regarding understanding and taking into account T&Cs? This is due to
space limitations, clarity, and experimental research motivated by this
question’s answers (not yet published).
the adverse effects that dark patterns might have on the
digital economy.
4.1. Harmfulness of dark patterns
To answer RQ1, we analyzed responses to interview
questions (a) and (c). Although we asked the experts
about dark patterns’ harmfulness, their answers deviated
towards discussing how different dark patterns work
and how and why certain categories are more or less
harmful. Here, the analysis revealed two categories of
dark patterns—first-generation and second-generation.
Additionally, interviewees have discussed the concept
of vulnerability extensively, particularly considering the
latter category of dark patterns.
4.1.1. First-generation dark patterns. The first
-generation dark patterns are designs that are relatively
easy to identify both by consumers and by regulators.
They are more likely to self-regulate, as described by
P4 “[They make] you accept something you are not
willing to accept. I think that it is a problem, but it
[...] has a tendency to balance itself because people will
neglect or decline from revisiting shops that use these
too aggressively.”
One of the themes related to the discussion on the
harmfulness was that the first-generation dark patterns
result in economic loss. They rely on behavioral biases
and usually induce hidden costs. As P4 described it:
“you have to read the fine print so that you turn up with
your printed boarding pass; otherwise, they will charge
you some fee that has nothing to do with cost recovery.”
Some commonly known dark patterns were listed in the
context of economic loss, e.g., scarcity-based patterns
(Figure 2) or hidden cost.
The first-generation dark patterns might be easier to
identify and consequently easier to regulate. However,
that does not mean these dark patterns are benign. Even
though some regulations might forbid such designs, the
regulatory bodies may struggle to identify economic
loss dark patterns because they might be presented
to consumers after creating an account, thus limiting
regulators’ surveillance techniques.
Other harmful first-generation dark patterns restrain
consumers, e.g., lock consumers in one service. They
make it difficult to cancel the service or unsubscribe, as
they “get you to lock in the purchase and not let you
shop around” (P3). There are also dark patterns that
restrain through hiding choice. One of the examples
relates to advertising, where companies use emotion to
deceive consumers: “when you are trying to opt-out from
providing data for personalized advertising, you see ‘You
Page 4700
Figure 2. The example of scarcity bias-based
urgency dark pattern.
Figure 3. The example of pressuring consumers to
purchase through showing activity of others.
will get less relevant results.’ While what it exactly says
is we will not use your data to target you or segment
you based on different things, or try to predict what you
might want to have” (P7).
4.1.2. Second-generation dark patterns. The
second-generation patterns were more prominently
discussed by our experts. The second-generation
patterns are hard to identify by consumers and difficult
to describe. Often relying on extensive data collection,
they might target individual consumers and their
vulnerabilities. In contrast to the first-generation,
second-generation patterns are hard to notice, regulate
by law, and they are less likely to self-regulate. They
were perceived as more harmful because their effects are
arduous to recognize.
One example of a second-generation dark pattern
comes from the hotel industry, where a hotelier might
have different types of rooms (P3). They apply one
of the activity patterns (Figure 3). Consumers are
encouraged to buy due to the limited number of rooms
of a particular type. There is no way of knowing whether
the hotelier has “a number of different room types, all
of which are basically similar, and they might have
segmented their rooms in a way to make it look like
they are always running out of one room type or another”
(P3). It is also hard to assess if a specific algorithm
ensures that these room types are always prioritized
and shown to the consumer first in the search results.
Consequently, consumers cannot know whether they are
being manipulated, while a regulator might struggle to
distinguish whether the service contains a dark pattern or
not.
Privacy. Another issue discussed by our interviewees
relates to privacy. The privacy-violating dark patterns
(resulting in extensive data collection without the
consumer knowledge, e.g., privacy Zuckering—here, a
service collects more data than the consumer agreed to
and shares it with other parties) are on the border between
the second-generation and first-generation patterns.
What brings them more towards the former is that they
rely on extensive and ubiquitous data collection, which
incoherent information disclosures of privacy policies or
different dark patterns often prevent understanding. It is
commonly acknowledged that people are often unaware
of data collection and processing practices for many
reasons. For instance, they might not understand how the
technology works: “I think people do not understand its
implications. They say, ‘I got nothing to hide,’ ‘I don’t
care seeing adverts at all.’ They don’t understand the
idea of the profile being built on them individually and
how it might be misused” (P3).
An interesting point was raised by one of our
interviewees regarding the problematics of the digital
market framework based on, what they called, the
“financial framework” —exchanging payment for some
goods. The framework implies that if something goes
wrong within the transaction, the consumer can request
compensation. Considering the data collection, it might
be impossible to receive data back. Regulations, e.g.,
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), guarantee
consumers access to, and deletion information companies
hold about them. However, it is possible that when the
consumer requests their information to be deleted, it was
already utilized, contributing to the company’s profits
and potential consumer loss, both of which might be
difficult to quantify.
Usefulness. Another issue raised by our experts
considering the second-generation patterns was their
usefulness. Some interviewees questioned whether
the extensive collection of personal information and
customized services are beneficial for the consumer.
Personalization could have positive effects, but it also
poses a challenge for consumer agencies. As P5 said:
“some consumers I think, they see it as a good service
that a company knows when I have been looking for
a certain product, and it will be at a lower price, and
then I suddenly get that offer on my computer.” On the
other hand, the extensive data might be used to exploit
weaknesses, e.g., companies using dark patterns that have
an effect only when specific vulnerabilities are targeted—
“if you are targeting those addicted to gambling, for
example, by using those big buttons containing slogans
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like ‘try your luck’ ”(P1). Regardless, second-generation
patterns might be perceived as useful because they
contain information, which if truthful, could help to
make better choices (e.g., true testimonials indicating
problems with products or service)— “it can be useful to
know that there are not many places left when you are
booking somewhere, and you should make your mind
up”(P4). Nevertheless, when false (fake reviews hiding
the product’s faults), such information might be used to
prevent shopping around, reducing the probability of the
optimal choice.
4.1.3. Vulnerability. Our interviewees admitted that
they had little practical experience with vulnerable
consumers. However, some mentioned the “traditionally”
vulnerable groups, such as people with cognitive
impairments, financially vulnerable, low income, specific
age groups (younger and older generations), and low
numeracy, might more likely become dark patterns’
victims. Still, notably in the context of second-generation
patterns, our experts expressed concerns about the
context-dependent vulnerability, which becomes an
issue when companies collect extensive amounts of
information about an individual. “Because the company
knows a lot about you, they could know your weaknesses,
your disabilities, or that you are currently in a bad
place in your life, [...] and they could target you with
marketing or offers that are directly linked to where
you are at the moment, e.g., after divorce” (P1). The
context-dependent vulnerability creates an opportunity
for unethical business practices, and it enables companies
to, instead of targeting one particular group of people,
potentially target all consumers. The many contextual
factors, such as time pressure, psychological aspects (e.g.,
mood, stress), make people temporarily vulnerable. “I
think that for a few days or maybe a week will make me
more vulnerable. [...] these kinds of things, whether it
is physical events, psychological events, life events, all
of those kinds of things day-to-day, week-to-week, make
people vulnerable” (P8).
4.2. Reducing effects of dark patterns
Through the analysis of responses to interview
question (b), we attempted to answer RQ2 —identify
how to reduce consumer detriment and add to the market
well-functioning. Here, we applied the BCW (Table 1)
as a framework.
Policy categories. Policy-making—both legislation and
regulation—has been the most frequently mentioned
solution to overcome the effects of dark patterns.
Additionally, guidelines and service provisions were
discussed by experts.
Regulation & Legislation. Our experts addressed the
lack of rules about auditing and sharing the audit logs.
The design process documentation could be one of the
measures to prevent manipulative designs. “[An] audit
in which [companies] go about the decision making for
things like how they write their T&Cs, and the steps
they have gone through” (P3). If applied, such audit log
requirements could improve transparency and indicate
whether companies have done everything to ensure that
their designs do not negatively affect consumers.
Another way of reducing detriment is through
regulations informed by research. Although research
about dark patterns is growing, it is rarely applied as a
backbone for new regulations and legislation. According
to our experts, they should be based on empirical
evidence, e.g., “if you have evidence of harm and
market failure, I think things need to be banned” (P4).
There should also be more research dedicated to the
quantification of the harmful effects of dark patterns.
The outcome-based strategies to regulate the market
are another way to ensure its well-functioning. In the
traditional approach, regulators require companies to
disclose certain information, e.g., “it must be clear, it
must be placed in a relevant part of the product page
[. . . ] then if the company complies [...] everything
is fine” (P5). Our interviewees criticized such an
approach and proposed an improved version of it, where
companies must convey certain information without
receiving instructions on how this should be done. Here,
companies only need to make the information displays
effective. This approach would impact how the regulators
work. Instead of asking companies what they did,
they could focus on the actual outcomes—checking
whether consumers noticed and understood the displayed
information. As P5 explained: “So, it is sort of
outcome-based strategy; instead of providing inputs, we
specify outputs that must be there, and then we let the
firms to fulfill those outputs to the best of their ability.”
On the other hand, such an approach could challenge
the current practices that regulators apply to surveil
companies, e.g., in some countries, it is not easy
to purchase without a real identity, while arranging
a fake identity is illegal. However, these obstacles
could be subdued, “You are doing the test for an
average representative sample of consumers and seeing
whether firms are meeting the standard” (P8). Here, the
consumers’ panels could provide insights into reading,
understanding, and interacting with specific designs.
The dialogue between companies and regulators was
also mentioned as a way to subdue dark patterns. Such
dialogue might be a good start in identifying where the
border between nudging and manipulating is—“As an
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enforcer, nearly all the time you feel that you are one step
behind. But using the dialogue method at least would
allow getting hold of the honest traders” (P2).
Lastly, there is a need for a precise definition of
prohibited terms. Such prohibition relates mainly to
T&Cs and the concept of informed consent, which might
be affected by dark patterns. Among interviewees, the
concept of consent was also questioned: “I just think that
there is a need for a movement away from this idea of
consent [...] I think, for certain things it makes sense, but
for others, it does not” (P4).
Guidelines. Other theme identified in the data relates
to guidelines —lack of documentation checklists. The
companies could benefit from the concise information
on how to document the design process. Such checklists
could help to “prove that [companies] are honest” (P3). In
some ways, related to the lack of checklists is the lack of
precise specifications. There are no comprehensible lists
of disclosure specifications: “we have to specify what
information the consumer needs, and then, whenever we
do that, we also have to specify how” (P5).
Guides could help especially smaller companies.
Without the appropriate resources, they might not be
able to assess maliciousness of their designs and instead
follow any commonly used designs. Guides, templates,
or design patterns could help such companies to comply
with the legal requirements. “[. . . ] Producing this kind of
best practice guides, and design patterns that companies
can use, at least as a starting point. [. . . ]” (P8) should be
applied together with outcome-based regulation.
Service provision. The last policy category
surfaced from the interviews relates to service provision,
particularly the lack of enforcement tools. Unlike most of
the above-described solutions, this one does not directly
relate to the companies but regulators. According to our
interviewees, not all of the dark patterns can be analyzed
with tools currently in use, which possibly affects the
effectiveness of enforcement. “We must get better tools
for picking up those data manipulations or similar. We
really have to put ourselves in the consumer’s shoes”
(P6). Such improved tools could target the texts of T&Cs
to make lawyers’ work more effective or help identify
misleading text-based and visual designs.
Intervention functions. The second part of the BCW
relates to intervention functions (Table 1). The experts
mentioned only a few intervention functions: education,
coercion, modeling, and training.
Education. One way to prevent dark patterns is
through a code of ethics implemented into teaching. Such
code could inform designers or other people who play
an active role in technology development, potentially
reducing intentional and unintentional dark designs.
However, education is not the soundest way of making a
change: “I think codes of ethics don’t work [. . . ]. They
are useful in education systems, to teach designers what
should matter or to teach people in the industry but
ultimately you need to have laws that impact companies
commercially, that have a financial impact on them” (P3).
Coercion. There is no meaningful punishment for
the use of dark patterns. Our experts suggested that one
way of implementing behavioral change would be by
punishment or costs enforced on companies, e.g., big
fines for not complying with rules.
Modeling. The results of coercion intervention
could be used as an exemplar of bad designs and
their consequences. “I think some really well-known
cases, where the worst of any companies are really
nailed to the wall for doing bad things, would require
companies to really take the law into action. [. . . ] I
think some really public cases of enforcement, of the
worst offenders, would help the industry as a whole” (P4).
The modeling intervention might be essential for smaller
companies without a team of lawyers, which base their
design-related decisions on competitors’ designs reported
in news outlets.
Training. Training is the only intervention function
applicable to regulators. There seems to be insufficient
training in the enforcement agencies, particularly in
countries with relatively well-developed consumer rights
legislation, such as the EU members. For instance,
enforcement agencies might lack personnel with a good
understanding of the digital market and technology. Such
personnel requires training to make their work more
efficient and robust.
Changes to consumers’ behavior. The interviewees
did not extensively discuss direct changes to consumers’
behavior. Perhaps this is because consumers should not
be overloaded with information and learning. Although
in some instances friction could be added to the
design to activate people’s reflective thinking regarding
the decision (e.g., in context of privacy-related dark
pattern) [29, 30], it is not clear how designs that
slow down the interaction would affect usability or
experience in a different contexts (e.g., at the last stage
of purchasing process). Regardless, our interviewees
shifted responsibility for informed decision-making away
from the consumer towards policymakers, regulators, and
service providers.
Nonetheless, on few occasions, the experts mentioned
that the consumers’ education and awareness could
help prevent the detrimental effects of dark patterns—
“Awareness-raising is, of course, something very
important as well” (P1). However, it is hard to raise
awareness, for instance, about second-generation dark
patterns, as they are challenging to detect. However,
communication and marketing as an intervention
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function might be one way to improve consumers’
decisions: “as a consumer agency, we have an obligation
to inform consumers, but I am not sure whether they
will listen to us. [. . . ] Maybe we could provide some
information on our website or on the telephone” (P6).
5. Discussion
5.1. Harmfulness of dark patterns
Our first objective was to categorize dark patterns
according to their harmfulness (RQ1). However, our
interviewees, instead of focusing on the individual
dark patterns, assessed their harmfulness by dividing
them into two new categories—first-generation and
second-generation. To some extent, first-generation
patterns are more “traditional.” Here, interviewees
mentioned some of the well-known examples, e.g.,
hidden cost, scarcity-based patterns. It is unlikely
that companies will overuse such patterns as the
consumer might get annoyed and stop using the service.
Harmfulness seems to be associated with how easy it
is to identify dark patterns. Considering the COM-B
framework and new categorization, it appears that
first-generation patterns seem to affect consumers’
motivation or capability primarily. They often lead
to economic loss, restrains, and are heavily rooted in
heuristics and cognitive biases. While they are harmful,
they might be easier to regulate and intervene with.
The second-generation dark patterns might be more
harmful because of their insidious nature. These
patterns could be personalized, targeting specific
vulnerabilities. They are based on extensive data
collection, and consumers are often unaware that
sensitive data is used for personalization. Additionally,
in second-generation patterns, it is challenging to draw a
border between their useful and malicious nature. They
seem to affect all COM-B framework’s components,
including comprehension. They prey on cognitive
biases and combine various malicious tactics in one
mechanism that is hard to detect. The second-generation
patterns’ effects are difficult to measure, unlike, e.g.,
quantifiable economic loss. Considering all the above,
second-generation patterns might be difficult to regulate
or prohibit.
Our results show that dark patterns affect consumer
empowerment by adding to the personal detriment. They
prevent consumers from making “informed” decisions
by steering their opportunities, e.g., first-generation
patterns restricting ability to choose. Moreover, the
close relationship between the second-generation dark
patterns and privacy, which, when not protected,
enables extensive data collection directed at individuals’
weaknesses, appears a particular threat to consumers.
Here, consumers’ empowerment is non-existent because
the information needed to make optimal decisions (e.g.,
about potential consequences of decision) is beyond
consumers’ reach—hidden in companies’ policies and
T&Cs, or presented in a cognitively inaccessible
way. Therefore, both first- and second-generation
dark patterns impact digital market well-functioning,
particularly affecting its social (e.g., financial loss) and
technological (e.g., inaccessibility) dimensions.
Autonomous choice. Consumers have a right to
make autonomous choices. Dark patterns stand in the
way of autonomy, raising ethical concerns related to
manipulation. Online manipulation, defined as “the
use of information technology to covertly influence
another person’s decision-making” posses a thread in
many contexts, including the commercial one, and due
to its hidden nature, it requires extra vigilance [13].
Nevertheless, not all dark patterns manipulate—it
appears that perhaps the first-generation patterns might
be more likely coercive. For instance, the dark
pattern called forced enrollment pushes the consumer
to create an account and share their information to
preview a website. Here, coercion eliminates alternative
choices (e.g., previewing website without sharing data),
affecting market well-being through driving an unfair
and imbalanced competition (i.e., consumer locked in
one service).
We believe that some of the dark patterns
manipulate—if we agree that “feeling manipulated”
means not understanding why we behaved the way
we did or whether our actions were beneficial for
ourselves or others [13]. Moreover, manipulators (e.g.,
online companies or designers) “control [their] victim by
adjusting her psychological levers” [31]. Therefore, most
dark patterns should be deemed manipulative because
they frequently build on psychological effects, influence
consumers’ beliefs, desires, or emotions.
5.2. Overcoming barriers
We aimed to gain knowledge about the potential
ways to overcome consumer detriment—empowering
the consumer and ensuring fair market competition
(RQ2). Using the behavioral change wheel, we classified
possible solutions according to policy categories and
intervention functions. The experts extensively discussed
policy categories, especially regulation and legislation,
providing ideas for potential improvements of the digital
market. Although we used the BCW as a framework for
the data analysis, identified solutions apply primarily
to companies and regulators, not consumers directly.
However, they carry an indirect impact on consumers’
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behavior. The shift in the responsibility related to the
consumer choices seems appropriate, as some research
shows that end-users might fall for the manipulative
designs, even when they are aware of their existence [32].
Nevertheless, regulation and legislation—the most
discussed policy categories—have some disadvantages.
For instance, the transparency of the design process might
increase the market imbalance. Here, larger companies
might have an advantage over smaller companies
without the resources to comply with regulations. They
may not be able to perform the testing needed to
estimate whether the design has a detrimental effect on
consumers. However, such limitations could be subdued
by ensuring that the smaller companies receive adequate
help (e.g., through the service provision) or customizing
requirements depending on the company size (e.g., a
longer time to fulfill the requirements).
Our findings to some extent align with the framework
from [23] (published after our analysis). Here, to
assess the “dark” side of designs, the normative lens
should be applied, measuring individual and collective
welfare, regulatory objectives, and individual autonomy.
Notwithstanding a case study presented in [23], such
an approach’s implementation and effectiveness remains
unknown and should be evaluated. Still, considering
some similarities between our experts’ opinions and the
proposed framework, perhaps it is one way to assess
dark patterns and apply proposed solutions in regulatory
enforcement.
To sum up, dark patterns adversely affect consumers’
empowerment, leading to loss of autonomy, uninformed
decisions, and potential harms (e.g., economic loss).
They violate the principles of fair market competition,
preventing consumers from “shopping around,” where
companies utilizing dark patterns have “locked-in”
consumers in their services to maximize revenues [33].
However, dark pattern-like designs might be useful if
conveying true information (e.g., providing information
about the room types on hotel booking websites).
Therefore, the researchers’ and regulators’ challenge is to
assess accurately when the designs become “dark.” This
blurred borders between harmful and valuable effects of
patterns require further investigation. Some regulations
already target malicious designs (European Directive
2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices (UCPD) [34]
or California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) that directly
targets dark patterns [35]) they have their limitations.
For instance, the UCPD lists only some designs that
could be dark patterns, and the sanctions are still left
to be defined by the EU members independently and
might be too small. Another issue regarding legal
regulations is the problematic enforcement, for instance,
how the digital market should be surveilled or how to
identify and classify dark patterns designs. Here, the
more extensive research on dark patterns, especially
the second-generation, and the development of new
technologies could help.
5.3. Limitations and future work
We collected data from eight experts who expressed
their subjective opinions. We combined experts from
different fields and geographic areas to counterbalance
this limitation, but the sample size remained small.
Future research could apply different qualitative data
collection methods, increasing the sample size and
variability, e.g., through focus groups or workshops
containing groups of experts from different scientific
fields and nationalities. Such methods could assure that
individual dark patterns are presented to participants, and
their harmful effects are easier to assess. Additionally,
future research could apply BCW to make experts
familiar with the framework and then “brainstorm” their
solutions accordingly.
6. Conclusion
The current research results present a new
categorization of dark patterns concerning their harmful
effects. The first category is the first-generation
patterns that are harmful but relatively easy to
recognize and regulate. However, another category—the
second-generation patterns might be even more harmful
because they are built on extensive data collected from
unaware consumers and can target individuals’ temporary
vulnerabilities. Researchers and policymakers should
give this new category of dark patterns more attention.
Further, our findings denote possible guidelines to
tackle the adverse effects of dark patterns on consumers
and sustain a well-functioning digital economy. In
particular, we explain how the four policy categories
(regulation, legislation, guidelines, and service provision)
and the four intervention functions (education, coercion,
modeling, training), which, if implemented, could
change the behavior of regulators and online companies,
consequently improving consumers’ well-being.
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